UIC Law Review
Volume 19

Issue 1

Article 5

Fall 1985

Mandatory Mass Tort Class Actions: Litigating Catastrophes
without Creating Litigation Catastrophes, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 91
(1985)
Matthew K. Phillips

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew K. Phillips, Mandatory Mass Tort Class Actions: Litigating Catastrophes without Creating
Litigation Catastrophes, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 91 (1985)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss1/5
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

MANDATORY MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS:
LITIGATING CATASTROPHES WITHOUT
CREATING LITIGATION CATASTROPHES
Chemical spills, airplane crashes, building collapses and medical
misadventures have become common place. 1 Such mass torts kill or
maim hundreds of thousands, giving rise to numerous common
causes of action.' Despite their frequent occurrences which sever
multitudes of lives and limbs, no procedural device exists which
makes possible the expedient and efficient adjudication of mass
torts.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) recognize the
importance of compensating plaintiffs justly, defendants paying
their just dues and conserving judicial resources and thus mandate
that all of the rules should be construed to obtain the just, speedy
and efficient adjudication of every action.' In furtherance of these
goals, the Rules explicitly encourage those who suffer from a common cause to litigate their claims jointly." Under the Rules as presently construed, particularly Rule 23, however, the numerous vic1. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (Vietnam veterans' chemical exposure); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill., 644 F.2d
594 (7th Cir. 1981) (American Airline crash); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D.
415 (W.D. Mo. 1982), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988
(1982) (Hyatt Regency Hotel skywalk collapse); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon
Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1171 (1983) (defective birth control device).
2. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1177 [hereinafter cited as
Skywalk Cases]; Abed, 693 F.2d at 849 [hereinafter cited as Dalkon Shield].
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (scope of Rules). See infra note 61 (explanation of three
interests).
4. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (counterclaim and cross-claim); FED. R. Civ. P. 18
(joinder of claims and remedies); FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties);
FED. R. Civ. P. 22 (interpleader); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (class actions).
In common law courts, a plaintiff was limited in joining claims against a defendant. Only joinder of those claims which involved the same form of action was permissible. In equity courts, joinder standards were more relaxed, but were never made
completely clear. T. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 451-52 (1981).
Under the later Field Codes of Civil Procedure, joinder was allowed more readily
than under common law. However, even though joinder provisions were enunciated in
the Codes, they were often given a limited reading. See, e.g., Bateman v. Wymojo
Yarn Mills, 155 S.C. 388, 152 S.E. 675 (1930) (plaintiff not allowed to join three slander claims against the same defendant).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have more liberal joinder provisions than
the Field Codes had. Both joinder of claims and joinder of parties are encouraged.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 18 (joinder of claims); FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 20 (joinder of parties).
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tims of a mass tort cannot bring a joint action.5 Instead, these
victims litigate individually, wasting tremendous resources and contravening the goals of the Rules.
This comment details Rule 23's present inapplicability to mass
torts and illustrates that the Rules' goals only can be achieved if
mass torts are litigated as mandatory class actions. Recognizing the
need for a mandatory mass tort class action, this comment advances
alternative approaches which would require mass tort class action
litigation. First, this article demonstrates collateral estoppel's relevance in mass tort situations which warrants class action certification. Second, this article dispells the notion that mass tort victims
have a basic right to litigate their claims individually and provides
the theoretical underpinnings for amending Rule 23 so that it explicitly mandates mass tort class actions.
RULE 23's

CURRENT INAPPLICABILITY TO MASS TORTS

Class actions are maintainable where Rule 23(a)'s four prerequisites are satisfied. Rule 23(a) is satisfied where there exists: a large
number of claimants, common questions of law or fact, typicality of
claims and adequacy of representation.' In addition, the class must
have the characteristics required under Rule 23(b).7 Rule 23(b)(1)
5. See infra notes 6-43 and accompanying text.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is practicable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision; (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the
prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect
to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
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be pursued not by individual actions, but as
of two standards is met. One standard is
where "individual actions create a risk of
of conduct for the party opposing the

class. .. ,"' for instance, where a court enjoins a party from acting in

a manner which another court explicitly ordered that party to act.
The other standard is under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) where "individual actions threaten the disposition or impairment of other claimants' interests not joined in the action. .... 9,,for instance, where one suit

would bankrupt a defendant and leave similarly situated plaintiffs
without remedies.
Although courts consistently have held that Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
does not apply to mass torts, 0 courts have held that Rule
23(b)(1)(B) requires mass tort class certification in some instances.
encountered in the management of a class action.
Id. Rule 23(b)(2) primarily pertains to injunctive relief in a class mode. It is not applicable "to cases in which the appropriate trial relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages." Id. Because subsection (b)(2) does not directly pertain to
mass tort claims, it will not be discussed further in this comment.
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
10. The incompatible standards requirement was addressed in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), where 335
people were killed in an airplane crash and their representatives brought individual
actions against the airplane's manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas. McDonnell Douglas
sought class certification, arguing that if it won some of the suits and lost others, it
would be subjected to incompatible standards of conduct. Id. at 1086. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this contention, holding that a risk of inconsistent judgments did not constitute a risk of incompatible standards. Id. The court
stated that unless the defendant would be required to fulfill mutually exclusive judgments in separate actions, each requiring the defendant to act according to different
and opposite standards, class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was prohibited. Because the defendant could comply with inconsistent judgments merely by paying
those plaintiffs who win and not paying those who lose, the court ruled that no risk of
incompatible standards was present. Id. Thus, the results of individual actions may
differ, but the defendant's standard of conduct as to each of those decisions would be
compatible.
The following example illustrates the McDonnell Douglas court's reasoning. In
any given lawsuit, a defendant may either have an issue decided for or against him. If
suit one involves A v. B, and suit two involves Z v. B and the identical legal issues are
presented in both suits, B may prevail on all of the issues in suit one and yet prevail
on none of the issues in suit two. (For an explanation why B may not collaterally
estop Z in suit two, see infra note 44 and accompanying text) The results of the two
suits are clearly opposite, but, they are not incompatible. The conduct that the one
judgment allows of B does not forbid the conduct that the other judgment requires.
See McDonnell Douglas, 523 F.2d at 1086.
The McDonnell Douglas case is probably an incorrect interpretation of "incompatible standards." The court treats Rule 23(b)(1)(A) as requiring the equivalent
showing necessary for invoking interpleader under Rule 22. See also State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (interpreting the interpleader rule).
For a discussion of interpleader, see J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 501-03
(1981). Treating incompatible standards and interpleader as requiring equivalent
showings makes Rule 23(b)(1)(A) surplusage, which seems erroneous because Rule 22
had been adopted 18 years prior to Rule 23's adoption.

94
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Courts have interpreted Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to require class certification where a limited fund is available to satisfy claims arising from a
common cause. 1 A limited fund exists where the applicable substantive law restricts the maximum aggregate damages that may be
awarded or where the aggregate damage awards inescapably will
bankrupt the defendant." Absent class certification in such instances, the defendant's satisfying earlier plaintiffs' judgments
would exhaust the limited fund and subsequent plaintiffs' judgments against that defendant would be unsatisfiable.
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation3 is an example of a limited fund class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). In
Agent Orange, the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York determined that although the defendants' assets presently
were sufficient to satisfy judgments for compensatory damages, the
possibility of inconsistent punitive damage awards in individual
cases established a limited fund.14 The judge reasoned that courts
adjudicating later claims might admit evidence of prior awards of
punitive damages, inducing juries to reduce or to disallow punitive
damage awards, thus, as a practical matter, disposing of class members' interests who were not parties to the prior litigation. 5 The
court further stated that because punitive damages are extraordinary rather than compensatory in nature, they ought to be distributed among the plaintiffs on a basis other than date of trial."6
In re Northern District of CaliforniaDalkon Shield IUD Product Liability Litigation presented a similar situation. 7 In Dalkon
Shield, the district court certified a limited fund class, determining
that possible punitive damage awards exceeded the defendant's assets.18 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the class
certification order, reasoning that the mere possibility of a limited
fund did not satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(B)'s requirements. 9 The appellate court stated that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification is proper only
where separate punitive damage claims necessarily will affect later
11. See infra notes 13-21.
12. See Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Agent Orange]. A limited fund may exist regardless of the number of

defendants.
13.

Id.
Id. at 724-28.
15. Id.
16. Id. See also Comment, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under
Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HAv. L. REV. 1143, 1155-59 (1983).
17. Dalkon Shield, supra note 2, at 848-51. See also Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976) (Rule 23(b)(1)(B) applies where
aggregate claims of numerous plaintiffs exceed defendant's assets); Case Comment,
Class Actions for Punitive Damages, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1787, 1791-93 (1983).
18. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 521 F.
Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
19. Dalkon Shield, supra note 2, at 857.
14.
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claims. °
Agent Orange and Dalkon Shield indicate that Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class certification will be granted primarily in cases
where punitive damages are sought, it is likely that punitive damages will be awarded and the defendant's assets inescapably will be
insufficient to satisfy those awards.2 Because all mass tort claimants
do not seek punitive damages and because those who do cannot necessarily meet the limited fund test, few mass tort class actions will
be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
Although Rule 23(b)(1)(B) does not offer a procedural alternative to wasting resources through litigating mass torts individually,
nonmandatory mass tort class certification is available in some instances under Rule 23(b)(3).2 2 In addition to the prerequisites of
Rule 23(a),23 Rule 23(b)(3) requires the party seeking class certification to establish that litigating in a class action is superior to litigating in other modes. The financial impact on the parties and the effect on judicial resources influence whether superiority is
established.2 4 Further, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that classwide common questions of law or fact predominate over questions
affecting only individual class members.2 The factors considered in
establishing predomination are whether litigation already has been
commenced in other forums, whether it is desirable to concentrate
all of the litigation in one forum, whether considerable difficulties
are -likely to be encountered in managing a class action and whether
class members have significant interests in controlling their own litigation. 2 Although considerations of the first three elements usually
favor class certification, the fourth element has been the principal
barrier to mass tort class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).2
20. Id. at 851-52.
21. See id.; Agent Orange, supra note 12, at 724-28.
22. See supra note 7 (Rule 23(b)(3)).
23. See supra note 6 (Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites).
24. One method of evaluating superiority is to compare the potential amount of
time that would be spent litigating common issues in a class action with the amount
of time that would be needed to try individual issues. See Minnesota v. United-States
Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569 (D. Minn. 1968).
25. See supra note 7.
26. Id.
27. See Causey v. Pan Am World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(strong individual interest due to nature of injuries suffered in plane crash and high
financial value of wrongful death claims); Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566,
572 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (claimants have vital interest in controlling their own litigation
because asbestos exposure resulted in serious injury or death); Hobbs v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (injuries suffered in plane crash held to
affect such a significant aspect of the claimants' lives to warrant individual litigation).
See also Comment, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Collateral Estoppel by a
Non-Party, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1044 (1967); Comment, The Use of Class
Actions for Mass Accident Litigation, 23 Loy. L. REV. 383, 397 (1977).
"[Tihe most contested consideration in the predomination analysis concerns the
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In denying Rule 23(b)(3) class certification, courts have reasoned that where personal injuries are involved, a plaintiff has a basic right to litigate individually. Characterizing the right to litigate
individually as "basic" allows a plaintiff to seek the greatest monetary award possible.2 8 Rule 23(b)(3) honors this interest with an
"opt out" provision2 9 which permits class members to forgo class
participation and to litigate their claims individually."0 Notice of the
opt out right must be issued"' and, where the relationship between
the class and the defendant truly is adverse, the class is required to
pay the issuance cost, which usually is substantial."2
interest of individual class members in controlling their own separate actions." Comment, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47
ALB. L. REV. 1180, 1215 (1983). But cf. The Proposed Uniform Class Actions Act: The
Special Committee on Uniform Class Actions Act, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, C.A.R. Comment, 4 CLASS AcTION REP. 190 (1975).
The comment further states:
Just because class members have filed individual suits or because their claims
are large or, for personal injury victims, clothed with emotional attachment, it
cannot be presumed that all class members so desire to control their own litigation as to forgo the substantial savings in litigation expenses and attorney
fees that the class action device can confer.
Id. at 195.
28. See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text (discussion of right to litigate
individually).
29. A Rule 23(b)(3) class action must also fulfill the stipulations of Rule 23(c)
which provides:
(c) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if
he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c). For judicial acknowledgment of the conditional nature of class
certification, see Agent Orange, supra note 12, at 770.
The continued objection to mass tort class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is
particularly problematic in light of Rule 23(c)'s allowance of any class member to
enter an appearance of counsel. Because the rule has both an "opt out" provision and
an entry of counsel provision, a class member may completely control his own litigation if he so desires or he may exercise control over part of it and enjoy the benefits
of class adjudication as well. Rule 23(b)(3) essentially provides a class member with
the best of both worlds, control and efficiency.
30. See supra note 27 (cases where similar claims were litigated individually).
31. See supra note 29 (Rule 23(c)'s prerequisities).
32. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
In Eisen, petitioner brought a class action, suing on behalf of all buyers and
sellers of odd-lots on the New York Stock Exchange. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41
F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Respondent brokerage firms Carlisle and Jacquelin and
DeCoppet & Doremus together handled 99% of the exchange odd-lot business. Id. at
149. Petitioner alleged that respondent brokerage firms had monopolized odd-lot
trading in violation of the SHERMAN ACT, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1949).
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Despite the imposing cost of issuing notice and the presumed
basic right to litigate individually, federal district courts in Agent
Orange"3 and Payton v. Abbott Labs34 recently certified two mass
tort class actions under Rule 23(b)(3). In Agent Orange, the court
certified a class action to decide common issues relating to causation, warning and affirmative defenses.3" In Payton, the court certiInitially, the district court determined that petitioner's suit was not maintainable
as a class action. Id. On appeal, the court of appeals issued two decisions referred to
as Eisen I, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966) and Eisen II,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). Eisen I held that the district court's decision was a final order and consequently appealable. Eisen, 370 F.2d
at 121. Eisen II remanded petitioners suit to the district court to reconsider whether
a class action should be certified. Eisen, 391 F.2d at 559. On remand, the district
court certified a class and entered orders regarding the notice required to be issued.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The district court determined that individual notice to all identifiable class members would cost $255,000. The court reasoned, however, that due process did not require individual notice to the class members and it adopted a notice package which
would fulfill due process requirements and yet only cost $21,720. Eisen, 52 F.R.D. at
260. The named petitioner, however, had injuries which totalled only $70.00 and was
reluctant to pay the notice costs.
Rather than dismiss the suit, the court decided to impose the notice cost on respondents if petitioners could show a strong likelihood of success on the merits at a
preliminary hearing. After the hearing, the district court issued an order stating that
the petitioner would more likely than not prevail on the merits and, therefore, respondents should bear 90% of the notice cost ($19,548). Id. at 262. This decision was
appealed as Eisen III. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Eisen III court ordered the dismissal of the class action, stating its disapproval of the district court's reasoning regarding notice cost. Eisen, 479 F.2d at 1010.
The appeallate court's decision was subsequently petitioned to the Supreme Court. In
affirming the Second Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court held that individual notice was required and that the class must bear the notice cost. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 158.
The Court cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950),
as authority requiring that individual notice be provided to those class members who
are identifiable through a reasonable effort. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 175. The Court stated
that in the case before it, 2,250,000 class members were easily ascertainable and,
therefore, required notice of the class proceedings. Id. at 176. The Court further
stated that "the usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially bear the cost of notice to
the class. . . .[Wihere, as here, the relationship is truly adversary [sic], the plaintiff
must pay for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own
lawsuit." Id.
33. Agent Orange, supra note 12, at 720.
34. 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1982) (DES case).
35. Agent Orange, supra note 12, at 720, involved claims for relief for injuries
sustained in Vietnam from the use of Agent Orange. Agent Orange was a chemical
defoliant which the defendants manufactured and sold to the United States government. Id. The plaintiffs sought class certification of two classes pursuant to Rule 23.
They contended that the many issues presented would best be determined, thereby
avoiding duplicative litigation, if the suit proceeded as a class action. Id. at 723.
The court found that common questions of law and fact predominated over other
issues which were present and that class adjudication was superior to other available
methods for fair and efficient litigation. Id. at 722-28. Therefore, it certified a Rule
23(b)(3) class. Id.
The district court also certified a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class because it determined
that probable punitive damages awards established a limited fund. Agent Orange,
supra note 12, at 722-28. The certification orders were later challenged through a writ
of mandamus, but the petition was denied. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 635
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fled a class action to resolve the issues of whether and when the
defendants knew or should have known of the dangers of DES exposure. 36 Both courts, however, emphasized the conditional nature of a
Rule 23(b)(3) class certification and stipulated that neither classwide liability issues nor damage issues would be determined in the
7
class action.1

Notwithstanding these two recent class certifications, Rule
23(b)(3) does not provide a satisfactory means to litigate mass tort
class actions. Even where Rule 23(b)(3)'s "predominance" and "superiority" requirements are met, the cost of issuing notice usually is
insurmountable.3 8 Additionally, where certification is warranted and
cost of issuing notice is not prohibitive, the notion that each plaintiff has the right to litigate his claim individually,39 and thereby receive the highest possible damage award, lures many class members
to opt out of the class, dissipating the class action's benefits.40 Consequently, courts certify few Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class actions,
and those few which are certified do not offer expedient or efficient
means to litigate mass torts."'
With courts certifying few mass tort class actions, most mass
tort victims individually litigate their claims, causing duplicative actions and wasting tremendous resources. This comment offers two
alternatives to this duplication and waste: Rule 23 should be either
liberally construed as presently drafted, thereby recognizing collateral estoppel effects and requiring mass tort class certifications,42 or
43
amended, expressly mandating mass tort class actions.
F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. Payton, 83 F.R.D. at 391-92.
37. Agent Orange, supra note 12, at 720; Payton, 83 F.R.D. at 394.
Rule 23(c)(1) provides that all class certifications are conditional. "As soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court
shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on
the merits." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). For a discussion of Rule 23(c), see supra note 29.
38. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
39. See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text (discussion of claimants' interests in individually litigating claims); see generally Dalkon Shield, supra note 2, at
848-50. In Dalkon Shield, the district court certified Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and Rule
23(b)(3) class actions on a motion raised sua sponte. Id. at 852. Subsequently, both
the plaintiffs and the defendant challenged the certification order. Id. at 849-50. The
court designated lead counsel resigned and no new counsel was appointed. Id. at 851.
After the resignation, the court seemed dismayed at the thought of selecting adequate
counsel and questioned whether any counsel would be adequate. However, seven law
firms were named in the appellate record. Id. at 848.
40. If a significant number of class members chose to opt out of the class proceedings, litigation of numerous individual suits would follow, which would render
continuing the class proceeding relatively useless.
41. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discussion of the resources
litigating mass tort claims individually wastes).
42. See infra notes 44-57.
43. See infra notes 58-103 and accompanying text.
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CHANGES IN RULES

23's

CONSTRUCTION

The use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel in mass tort
situations renders decisions in earlier lawsuits dispositive of claims
in later lawsuits." This effect falls squarely within Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
mandatory class certification.45
The United States Supreme Court first recognized nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel ("offensive collateral estoppel") in
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore"6 where the plaintiffs sought to col44.

The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, though distinct legal

principles, are often mistakenly used interchangeably. Res judicata bars parties to a
prior action or their privies from relitigating the same cause of action. See Palmer v.
Clarksdale Hosp., 213 Miss. 611, 57 So. 2d 476, 478 (1952). Res judicata is often referred to as claim preclusion. Collateral estoppel, in contrast, bars parties to a prior
action or their privies from relitigating an issue dicided in the previous action. See
Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 22 P.2d 892 (1942). Collateral estoppel is
referred to as issue preclusion.
Res judicata is nondiscretionary in nature because, without it, judgments would
lack conclusiveness and finality. James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th
Cir. 1978). The application of collateral estoppel is discretionary in nature because it
primarily serves to promote judicial economy, an important, but nonessential, commodity. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Collateral estoppel, although discretionary in nature, has a broader scope than res judicata in jurisdictions where mutuality of estoppel is not required.
Mutuality of estoppel requires two conditions to be fulfilled before collateral estoppel may be applied. First, the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party from the prior lawsuit
where the issue sought to be estopped was decided. Second, the party asserting collateral estoppel would have been bound by a contrary decision on the issue sought to be
estopped in the prior suit.
Mutuality can be illustrated as follows:
(1) First Action: Plaintiff v. Defendant - Judgment for Plaintiff. Second Action:
Plaintiff v. X - because X was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the first
action, due process prohibits the use of the prior judgment in the action against X.
(2) First Action: Plaintiff v. Defendant - Judgment for Defendant. Second: Plaintiff v. X - X wants to use the prior judgment against Plaintiff as a defense. Mutuality
prevents X from using the prior judgment because X would not have been bound if
the judgment in the first action had been for Plaintiff.
(3) First Action: Plaintiff v. Defendant - Judgment for Plaintiff. Second Action:
X v. Defendant - X wants to use the prior judgment against Defendant to preclude
Defendant from relitigating an issue previously decided against him. Mutuality prohibits X from seeking to benefit from an earlier action to which X was not a party.
45. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provides for class certification where individual litigation
would impair or dispose of claimants' interests not joined in the litigation. For a discussion of the current judicial interpretation and application of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), see
supra notes 6-43 and accompanying text.
46. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Parklane involved a stockholder's class action against a
corporation, its officers, directors, and stockholders who allegedly had issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement in violation of §§ 14(a), 10(b) and 20(a) of
the SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT of 1934. The case presented the question whether a
party who had issues decided adversely to it in an equitable action could be collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues before a jury in a subsequent legal
action brought against it by a new party. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 324.
The Court noted that its previous decision in Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 32829, had involved the use of defensive collateral estoppel, whereas the case before it
involved the use of offensive collateral estoppel. The Court stated that the use of
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laterally estop the defendant from rearguing an issue it had lost in a
previous lawsuit involving different plaintiffs. The Court estopped
the defendant from rearguingthe issue, but emphasized that considerations of fairness to the defendant would prohibit using offensive
collateral estoppel if the plaintiff could have intervened easily in the
earlier action, but simply chose not to.47 Thus, under Parklane, a
plaintiff may not "wait-and-see" an action's result and then use
favorable findings to collaterally estop the defendant from relitigating those decided issues.
Although allowing plaintiffs to "wait-and-see" would in theory
defeat offensive collateral estoppel's theoretical purpose: promoting
judicial economy,' proving that a plaintiff adopted a "wait-and-see"
approach is extremely difficult. 4 The consequences of this practical
offensive collateral estoppel "does not promote judicial economy in the same manner
as defensive use does." Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329. The use of defensive collateral
estoppel precludes a plaintiff from relitigating identical issues by merely switching
adversaries. See Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. Thus, the use of defensive collateral estoppel encourages joinder of all potential defendants in the first action; offensive collateral estoppel creates precisely the opposite incentive.
Because a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against the defendant but will not be bound by a judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has an
incentive to adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude. See, e.g., Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal.
App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327 P.2d 111, 115 (1958); Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560,
571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965). Although the Parklane Court recognized arguments
regarding the negative aspects of allowing the use of nonmutual offensive collateral
estoppel, it determined that none of the circumstances that might justify reluctance
to adopt it were present. The Court applied the doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel and barred the defendant from relitigating those issues previously
decided against it.
47. Parklane,439 U.S. at 331-32.
48. For a discussion on the purpose of collateral estoppel, see infra note 51. See
also Byassee, CollateralEstoppel Without Mutuality: Accepting The Bernhard Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1423 (1982); Maedgen & McCall, Current Problems, Tools and
Theories in Multiparty Products Liability Cases, 18 FORUM 117 (1982); Comment,
Collateral Estoppel: One Full an Fair Opportunity to Litigate Common Facts, 39 J.
Mo. B. 405 (1983).
49. "More difficult to apply than the fairness criteria is that portion of the
Parklane rule prohibiting the use of offensive collateral estoppel by a plaintiff who
could have easily joined the first suit. The Supreme Court [in Parklane] did not define the type or degree of case which is relevant or necessary." Collins v. Seaboard
Coastline R.R., 516 F. Supp. 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1981). The Collins court went on to reason that because the plaintiff did not have everything to gain and nothing to lose by
not intervening in the prior action, the use of offensive collateral estoppel should not
be precluded. See id. Ironically, in reaching its conclusion that the defendant should
be estopped, the court stated that "it will not speculate why plaintiff decided not to
join her husband's [prior] suit ..
" Id. This reluctance to speculate indicates that
the burden of persuasion as to establishing the existence or nonexistence of a "waitand-see" approach is on the defendant. The result of this allocation of burden is that
the defendant must prove a negative: the plaintiff did not have a bona fide purpose
for failing to intervene. This is a difficult burden to establish. See Starker v. United
States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir. 1979) (use of offensive collateral estoppel per-.
mitted despite opportunity to intervene).
Even if the three Parklane criteria are satisfactorily met: incentive to fully litigate in prior suit, other inconsistent judgments and additional procedural opportuni-
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difficulty are important in mass tort settings where a large number
of similarly situated claimants may adopt a "wait-and-see" approach
with little risk of being discovered.
Courts have reasoned that because "waiting-and-seeing" theoretically is prohibited, determinations in one action will not impair
the interests of claimants who were neither parties to nor in privity
with parties to that action." Consequently, certification for reason
of impairment under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) has been foreclosed. However, courts erroneously have concluded considering offensive collateral estoppel's effects at this point, rather than separately considering its dispositive effects."
ties, the use of offensive collateral estoppel has important practical consequences. See
Parklane,439 U.S. at 331-32. See also infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
Because the initial focus is on the defendant's due process rights, and the subsequent focus is on the reason why the plaintiff did not intervene, judicial economy is
not adequately considered. Although the Parklane Court reasoned that estopping a
defendant on issues previously litigated provided efficiency, it was not deciding a
mass tort case. In a mass tort setting, there are numerous plaintiffs who may wait for
a desirable decision and then bring their suit. It may well be true that allowing the
later suing plaintiffs the use of offensive collateral estoppel is more efficient than relitigating all of the issues previously decided, but it is also less efficient than adjudicating the entire group of plaintiffs in a class action. See infra notes 99-103. A mass
tort setting was not present in Parklane and therefore its decision is not dispositive
of whether class certification is necessary in mass tort settings.
50. See, e.g., Dalkon Shield, supra note 2, at 857.
51. Discussion of collateral estoppel for class action purposes is pertinent to the
issue of disposition under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Taking as true the premise that plaintiffs
may not adopt a "wait-and-see" approach, disposition of future suing plaintiff's
claims does not occur and, therefore, class certification is denied.
The problem, however, is that this premise is often taken for granted without the
specific instances of each case being scrutinized. One commentator stated that
"[c]learly, res judicata or collateral estoppel cannot be used in such a situation."
Comment, Federal Mass Tort Class Action: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency,
47 ALB. L. REV. 1180, 1198 (1983). Acceptance of this premise as a given, as that
commentator did, can only result in an increase in the number of persons adopting a
"wait-and-see" approach rather than joining in the current litigation. A solution to
this dilemma would be a mandatory mass tort class action. See infra notes 58-103
and accompanying text.
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) requires class certification wherever separate actions would either impair the ability of later suing plaintiffs to protect themselves or would be dispositive of the interests of others not participants in the adjudication. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). Therefore, two questions must be answered in the negative for
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) not to apply. The initial suit must not impair, and the initial suit
must not be dispositive of, later claims of nonparties. Id. Furthermore, the named
parties must adequately represent the claims of the entire class. Adequacy of representation depends, for the most part, on the qualifications and interests of counsel for
the representatives. Agent Orange, supra note 12, at 788. It should be the smallest
impediment to class certification because of the many able law firms which surely
would accept the notoriety and fees which a mass tort class action would provide. If
finding adequate counsel did prove to be a problem, a system could be established
whereby the court would appoint counsel, as is presently done in the criminal law
area.
Furthermore, if a class were certified and a decision rendered on the merits, the
findings may not bind a party who is subsequently determined not to have been adequately represented. To bind such a party would be a deprivation of that party's
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The following example illustrates the relevant difference between impairment and disposition and why they must be considered
separately.52 Assume an airplane crash in which hundreds of people
are killed and no one survives. Further, assume A, a passenger's surviving spouse, brings a suit against B, the airplane's designer, and B

loses on all issues, including liability. C, also a passenger's surviving
spouse from the same mass tort that spurned A's lawsuit, may later
initiate suit two (C v. B), and effectively use offensive collateral estoppel to bind B on any issue B lost in suit one (A v. B.). 5 3 None of
the determinations in suit one bind C because C was neither a party
to suit one nor in privity with A. 5 4 Therefore, C's interests are held
right to due process. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (prohibiting use of
collateral estoppel against a party not adequately represented in a prior class action).
52. For the purpose of this example, nonmutuality of estoppel is presumed the
applicable law. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (approving the
use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel).
53. For a discussion of the operation of collateral estoppel, see supra notes 44
and 51.
54. In denying the use of collateral estoppel against nonrepresented claimants,
focus is on the due process requirements which are not honored if a person not a
party to, or in privity with a party in a prior lawsuit, is bound by determinations
made in that suit. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 320-28 (1971) (due process would be violated if prior action were binding on
a claimant who was not adequately represented in a class); Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 4041.
In Hansberry, the defendants, a black family, bought land in an area of Chicago
which was allegedly covered by a racially restrictive covenant. The plaintiff, representing other landowners, brought a class action to enjoin the breach of the covenant.
Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 370, 24 N.E.2d 37, 39 (1939). See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2) (class action certification for injunctions). In a previous action, the Hansberry's vendors had been members of a class of plaintiffs which successfully enforced
the covenant against the other defendants.
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the initial lawsuit was a class action
and that in a class suit, "where the remedy is pursued by a plaintiff who has the right
to represent the class to which he belongs, other members of the class are bound by
the result in the case unless it is reversed or set aside.
... Lee, 372 Ill. at 371, 24
N.E.2d at 40. The court further reasoned that because the Hansberry's vendors had
been members of the plaintiff class in the prior suit' which upheld the covenant, the
Hansberrys were, in effect, in privity with the prior plaintiff class. The court reached
this conclusion even though the class had argued the validity of the covenant and the
Hansberrys were arguing against the validity of the covenant. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding determining that the
Hansberrys were not successors in interest to or in privity with any of the losing
parties in the earlier suit. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 35. It found that it is a basic principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment rendered
in litigation where he was not a party or in privity with a party. Id. at 40. The Court
further noted that a class action is an exception to this basic principle. However, the
Hansberrys were arguing the exact opposite position than the position the class had
in the prior suit. Because the Hansberry's interests differed from the class's interest,
the class did not adequately represent the Hansberry's and, consequently, the prior
judgment did not bind the Hansberrys. Id. at 41.
The Hansberry case was similar to the following example. Suppose case one involved A v. B with B winning on all issues and case two involves Z v. B litigating the
same issues. B may not use defensive collateral estoppel to bar Z from arguing the
issues. To allow B to do so would violate Z's right to due process because he would be
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not to have been impaired.
Although suit two leaves C unimpaired, it is dispositive of B's
interests because B is estopped from relitigating those issues that
were decided adversely to him in suit one. Because those issues are
adversely dispositive of B's interests, conversely, they also are positively dispositive of C's interests, as well as the interests of all the
other crash victims who were not parties to that initial adjudication.
Offensive collateral estoppel's inherent dispositive nature causes
these results and should result in mandatory mass tort class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).65
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandates class certification where individual
actions would be dispositive of or threaten the impairment of later
lawsuits as a practical matter." Rather than adhering to this plain
wording, courts have misconstrued Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to require a
showing that separate actions inescapably will be dispositive of nonparty claimants' interests. 57 This more stringent requirement disredenied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim. See generally Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). However, if case one involved A v. B with
B losing on all issues and case two involves Z v. B and the same issues are present, Z
may use offensive collateral estoppel to bar B from rearguing those issues. Therefore,
foreclosure of the use of defensive collateral estoppel does not ipso facto mean that
the use of offensive collateral estoppel is foreclosed as well. In essence, the availability
of offensive collateral estoppel coupled with an adverse decision for the defendant
results in case one being dispositive of the defendant's interests in case two and all
subsequent cases involving the same issues.
Even if one were to accept the position that the prevalent use of offensive collateral estoppel constitutes disposition in some instances, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) only requires
certification in those instances where disposition will "as a practical matter" result.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). Thus, certification would not be required in those suits
which could not satisfy the "as a practical matter" requirement. See Parklane, 439
U.S. at 324.
55. For a discussion of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), see supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text. Because of the dispositive nature of offensive collateral estoppel, mass torts
ought to be certified as class actions. Application for a certification order may be
initiated by the plaintiffs, the defendants or the judge sua sponte. See Dalkon
Shield, supra note 2, at 849-50. (judge certified class on own motion, defendant
joined motion the next day).
56. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandates class certification if adjudications by individual
litigants would "as a practical matter" be dispositive of other claimants' interest. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). In Dalkon Shield, the court noted the Rule's express language
and yet adopted a stricter standard. See Dalkon Shield, supra note 2, at 851. The
court stated that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification is prohibited in "mass tort actions
unless the record establishes that separate punitive damages awards inescapably will
effect later awards." Id. (emphasis added). See also La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan
Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466-67 (9th Cir. 1973) (party proposing certification must show
that individual actions "inescapably alter the substance of rights of others...").
57. An example of a case which interpreted Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as requiring a
showing far less than inescapable effect is Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541
F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976). In Green, all of the plaintiffs' claims for damages exceeded
the assets of the defendant. Certification was granted to avoid any detrimental effect
of earlier individual claims upon later claims even though such an effect was only a
possibility. Id. at 1340 n.9.
Another reason courts should interpret Rule 23(b)(1)(B) liberally is that to do
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gards the plain meaning doctrine of statutory construction, circumvents the practical and liberal goals of the Rules and dissipates
offensive collateral estoppel's dispositive effects.
The purpose of the Rules will not be fulfilled unless they are
construed in a malleable, liberal manner. Such an interpretation
would recognize the ineffective constraints on the use of nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel in mass tort situations and would mandate mass tort class actions.
CONSIDERATIONS OF AMENDING RULE

23

Although a liberal interpretation of Rule 23 would mandate
otherwise may often require a mini-trial on the issue of whether disposition will occur. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the Supreme Court denounced such hearings.
417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). The Court stated, "[w]e find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained
as a class action. Indeed, such a procedure contravenes the Rule by allowing [one] to
secure the benefits of a class action without first satisfying the requirements for it."
Id. at 177.
Not only does the plain meaning doctrine of statutory construction support the
premise that only a showing of practical disposition is required under Rule
23(b)(1)(B), but the purpose of the Rules does as well. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The
scope of the Rule provides that the Rules "shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Id. This scope indicates that
the Rules are to be construed liberally and not in a fixed, static manner. See Eisen,
417 U.S. at 177. See also Skywalk Cases, supra note 2, at 1177. ("[Tlhe magnitude of
the litigation challenges this court to administer these cases with flexibility and
imagination").
In Dalkon Shield, 521 F. Supp. 1194, the common issues of fact and law which
satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements for class certification were "issues of negligence, strict products liability, the adequacies of warnings at relevant time periods,
breach of warranty, fraud and conspiracy." The district court judge stated: "[a]s this
court knows from its own experience in trying a nine-week case in 1980, any attempts
to try all these cases would bankrupt the district court's calendar and result in a
tedium of repetition lasting well into the next century." In re Northern Dist. Cal.
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
The appellate court vacated the California class' certification under Rule 23(b)(3)
because both the typicality requirement and the superiority requirement of Rule
23(a) were not met. Dalkon Shield, supra note 2, at 857. The appellate court further
reasoned that the district court had erred in certifying a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) nationwide
punitive damages class without determining that separate early punitive damages
awards would inescapably affect later awards. Id.
In a typical mass tort situation, such as an airplane crash or a cruise ship food
poisoning, it has been presumed that, "when personal injuries are involved, each
plaintiff should have a right to prosecute his own claim and to be represented by the
lawyer of his choice." Id. at 853. Courts' reluctance to certify mass tort class actions is
explained in part by the advisory comments to Rule 23 which provide:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an
action conducted normally as a class action would degenerate in practice into
multiple lawsuits separately tried.
39 F.R.D. 103 (1966).
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mass tort class actions, the judicial interpretations and applications
of Rule 23 have erected such precedential impediments to certifying
mass tort class actions that the Rule's amendment is justified. Nevertheless, amending Rule 23 to sanction mass tort class actions has
not been considered because it has been presumed that mass tort
victims have a basic right to litigate individually.58 This presumption is erroneous because the right to litigate individually is not a
basic right, rather, it is an ordinary right. This comment will illustrate the distinction between basic and ordinary rights and identify
the interests and goals that must be balanced in considering
whether Rule 23 should be amended. 9
The Rules' three primary goals, the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action,60 correspond to the three interests which are at stake in every lawsuit: the plaintiff being justly
compensated, the defendant paying his just due and conserving judicial resources." Fulfillment of these goals directly corresponds to
58. See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text (setting forth Rules 1 and
23(b)(1)(B)). In Yandler v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., the court listed several reasons why
mass torts are not certified as class actions, 65 F.R.D. 566, 571-72 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
The court stated:
The policy reasons for the disallowance of class actions in mass tort cases generally fall into three categories. First of all there is the general feeling that
when personal injuries are involved each person should have the right to prosecute his own claim and be represented by the lawyer of his choice. Secondly,
that the use of this procedure may encourage solicitation of business by attorneys. And finally that individual issues may predominate because the tort-feasor's defenses may depend on facts peculiar to each plaintiff.
Id. at 569 (citing 7A A. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §
1783 (1982).
59. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (goals of the Rules).
61. Benjamin Kaplin, Royal Professor of Law, Harvard Law School and reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in 1966 described the drafting of
Rule 23. Kaplin, Continuing Work of The Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REV. 356 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Kaplin]. Kaplin stated that the drafters were in general agreement to adopt Rule
23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2). However, there was criticism by some that the rule should
be confined to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and stay out of the
difficult area which 23(b)(3) now addresses. Id. at 394. "This timid course was unthinkable in the face of the insistent need to improve the methods of handling litigation affecting groups." Id.
Although those opposed to an adoption of Rule 23(b)(3) in any form lost their
argument, it was not a total defeat. Rule 23(b)(3) is the only section which has
mandatory notice and voluntary "opt out" provisions for class members. See FED. R.
CIv. P. 23(c)(2). The apprehension which was expressed at expanding the rule into the
Rule 23(b)(3) area explains why the rulemakers did not venture further and adopt a
Rule 23(b)(4) mandatory mass tort class action. In the words of Professor Kaplin,
"[tihe object [in formulating a class action procedural device] is to get at the cases
where a class action promises important advantages of economy of effort and uniformity of result without undue dilution of procedural safeguards for members of the
class or for the opposing party." Kaplin, supra, at 390. Thus, the three interests
which the committee implicitly balanced in adopting Rule 23 were the class members'
rights to compensation, (procedural safeguards for members of the class), the defen-
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the degree of satisfaction of these interests. These goals currently
are not fulfilled in mass tort situations because concern for the
plaintiff's compensation overshadows concerns for the defendant's
paying only his just due and for conserving judicial resources. In defense of favoring the interest of the plaintiff over the interests of the
defendant and the judiciary, it is asserted that mass tort victims
have a basic right to litigate individually.6" This assertion disregards
an important distinction made in philosophic literature between basic rights and ordinary rights. ss
Basic rights have corresponding duties.6 4 A duty exists, which
indicates that a corresponding basic right exists, when an obligation
is owed from one person to another. When one owes something to
another, that other has a basic right to what he is owed. Immanuel
Kant stated that basic rights have a supreme kind of worth, which
he called "moral worth," because an action that honors a basic right
derives its whole motivating power from the thought that duty requires it."
Natural law is the source of basic rights.66 Basic rights are discernible from man's very being. When a basic right is exercised, and
its corresponding duty is discharged, justice is done.
In a case where liability is not at issue, the plaintiff's interest in
being justly compensated is a basic right because it corresponds to
the defendant's duty to make amends for the injuries he caused to
that plaintiff. Thus, in civil litigation, the plaintiff's basic right and
the defendant's duty are equal to, in monetary terms, an amount
which is manifested in an award of damages. The concurrent paydant paying only his just dues (procedural safeguards for the opposing party), and
judicial economy (cases where important advantages of economy of effort will result).
In determining whether a Rule 23(b)(4) class action for mass torts should be established, these three concerns must be considered.
62. See supra notes 27-32, 58 and accompanying text (discussion of the right to
litigate individually).
63. While the word "right" is often used in different contexts, for the purpose
of this discussion it is necessary to distinguish between some rights and others. In a
natural law context, basic rights are distinguishable from rights of a lesser order. See
Hart, Are There Any NaturalRights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 179, 182 (1955). Basic rights are
distinguishable from rights of a lesser order because basic rights in one person always
have corresponding duties in another person; whereas, lesser rights in one person
have no such corresponding duties in another person. These lesser rights will be referred to as ordinary rights.
64. Joel Feinberg recognized the distinction between duty-owed privileges and
duty-less privileges and termed a privilege without a corresponding duty a claim. See
J. FEINBERT RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 130-42 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as J. FEINBERG]. "A duty. . .moreover, entails a right of a very specific kind,
called in the jargon of jurisprudence, a positive in personam right. That is, a right
against one specific person requiring him to perform a 'positive act,' not a mere omission." Id. at 131.

65.

I. KANT,

66.

Id. at 435 (definition and division of "Public Right").

THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT

435-58 (W. Hastie trans. 1952).
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ment and receipt of that amount constitutes justice.
Ordinary rights, in contrast to basic rights, have no corresponding duties. Ordinary rights are privileges or rewards."' If an ordinary
right at times is bestowed, but at other times is not, the intermittent
recipient should have no complaint; he only deserved the reward, as
opposed to having a basic right to it or grounds for claiming it as his

just due."'
Institutions are the sources of ordinary rights. 9 The aggregate
of institutionally created rights is positive law. The exercise of ordinary rights, unlike the exercise of basic rights, has no per se effect
on justice.70
The difference between basic and ordinary rights is one of
"kind." Basic rights are of a higher order and, because their source
is natural law, they persist until their corresponding duties are discharged. Ordinary rights are of a lower order and, because their
source is an institution, that institution may extinguish them with71
out injustice.
The difference between the two types of rights and their interplay is apparent in civil litigation. Assume A injures B, giving rise to
a basic right in B to compensation from A. In earlier times, B could
have sought compensation through self help or force. He may have
adopted a maxim such as survival of the fittest 72l or "an eye for an
eye" to implement his basic right.7 In short, imagination and re67. Joel Feinberg used a master servant scenario to depict the difference between a right and a claim. For example, a master or a lord who is not under an
obligation to reward his servant for especially good service still might feel that there
would be a special fittingness in giving a gratuitous reward as a grateful response to
good service. If the deserved reward were not given the servant, he would have no
complaint, "since he only deserved the reward, as opposed to having a right to it or
claim to it as his due." J. FEINBERG, supra note 64, at 145.
68.

Id.

69. Lawrence Kohlberg puts forth a theory of "justice as fairness" in which he
discusses the institutional source of ordinary rights and the importance of legal rights
to moral order. See Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Development Approach in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SO-

ISSUES 31-53 (T. Lickona ed. 1976).
70. The exercise of ordinary rights alone has no effect on justice because ordinary rights are of form as contrasted to basic rights which are of substance. In order
to effect "justice," some substance must be at stake. See generally Kohlberg, EducaCIAL

tion for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View in MORAL EDUCA-

TION 69-70 (N. Sizer ed. 1970).
71. Because the legal institution legitimately may promulgate ordinary rights, it
follows ipso facto that it legitimately may extinguish them as well.
72. C. DARWIN, THE ILLUSTRATED ORIGIN OF SPECIES 18 (intro. by R. Leakey
1979). Darwin's theory of evolution was that all species of plants and animals developed from earlier forms by hereditary transmission of slight variations in successive
generations. The forms of all species which survive are those that are best adapted to
the environment (the "fittest"). Darwin's theory is often referred to as evolution by
natural selection. Id.
73. S. MERCER, BABYLONIAN KINGS & RULERS 101 (1946). Hammurabi was a king
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sources were the only limits to a person's means of redress.
Today, it cannot be disputed that society may justly prescribe
in what manner one may seek redress. For instance, if A injures B,
society may justly prohibit B from taking A's oldest daughter as settlement of his claim. The legal institution promulgates ordinary
rights which circumscribe B's basic right to compensation. As long
as some means of just compensation exists, the institution may dictate the process through which it is obtained."' Thus, the institution
may legitimately require that B either resort to a legal forum to obtain a remedy or forgo his claim altogether.
Just procedures, whose moral legitimacy is not questioned,
often circumscribe basic rights. For example, once a claim or issue is
litigated, the same parties may not relitigate that claim.7 5 Further, a
plaintiff may be prohibited from bringing the same claim against the
same defendant 100 times.7 6 It is morally legitimate to limit basic
rights in such manners because only the form of asserting the rights
is being controlled; the substance of the rights still can be asserted
justly.
The legal institution also legitimately established workmen's
compensation laws to govern worker's tort claims.7 7 These laws are
legitimate because they circumscribe, but do not extinguish, the
worker's basic right to compensation. Similarly, the institution legitimately changed jury size from twelve to six jurors.7 8 For identical
reasons, it is neither argued that statutes of limitation are illegitimate nor disputed that issues may not be raised on appeal that were
7
not raised in a lower court proceeding. s
The institution additionally may legitimately restrict the forum
or mode s of litigation. For example, a remedy for a tort that occurred between two parties who, like the tort, are totally unconnected with New York City, cannot be obtained in that city simply
of Babylon in the 18th century B.C. He formulated what is known as the Code of
Hammurabi which held as a maxim for attaining justice, "an eye for an eye, a tooth
for a tooth ....
Id.
74. So long as a claimant's constitutional due process rights are protected, he
should have no complaint regarding the procedural means that avail him. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (procedural and substantive due process
guarantees).
75. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text (discussion of collateral
estoppel).
76. Id.
77. See generally Wilkonson, Alternative Theories to Worker's Compensation:
Serving the Injured Worker Better, 19 TRIAL 90, 96 (1983).
78. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1969) (discussion of what "jury
right" means).
79. See FED. R. APP. P. 4 ("Appeal as Right-When Taken"). See generally F.
WIENER, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY

80.

28 (1950).

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1937) (jurisdictional requirements).
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because that forum offers the highest damage award.81 Rule 23 illustrates this concept in mandating class actions in certain circumstances, regardless of whether the class members would rather litigate their claims individually.8 2
The common theme connecting the aforementioned examples is
that so long as the plaintiffs basic right can be asserted fairly, the
legal institution may dictate the procedural means for that right's
assertion. In dictating procedural means, the legal institution balances the three interests present in all litigation: the plaintiff being
justly compensated, the defendant paying only his just due, and judicial resources being conserved. These three interests were weighed
when the current doctrines of collateral estoppel, workmen's compensation, jury size, statutes of limitation, appealability of claims,
choice of forum, and choice of litigation mode were being considered
for adoption.8 3 Because the three interests were deemed properly
balanced under the proposed rules, the rules were enacted.
In a mass tort context, the three interests must be weighed in
light of the purpose of civil litigation-compensation.8 4 Ideally, compensation is an award of a dollar amount which represents the plaintiff's physical or emotional injury in concrete terms.8 5 Amounts,
however, are not awarded with certainty that the amount awarded
actually compensates the plaintiff for his injury. Thus, plaintiffs attempt to bring individual suits in forums which offer the "best" re81. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1937) (venue generally).
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (mandatory class action with no right to opt
out).
83. See supra note 61 (discussion of how the three interests were balanced in
formulating Rule 23).
84. "The prime purpose of damages in tort actions is to compensate a person
for injury caused by another's wrongful conduct and, to the extent possible, restore
the injured party to the position that would have been occupied had the wrong not
occurred." D. AXELROD, R. GOLDSTEIN, C. KIMBALL, M. MINZER, & J. NATEs, DAMAGES
IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.02 (1984) [hereinafter cited as DAMAGES]. See Tucker v. Calmar

S.S. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md. 1973) (fundamental goal of tort recovery is
compensation of the victim); Adams v. Dem, 173 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1969) (principle
underlying tort damages is compensation).
In Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573, 588 (Mo. 1978), the court
stated, "[tihe ultimate test for [the appropriateness of an award of] damages is
whether the award will fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for his injuries .... At common law, damages were awarded for different reasons than they are
today. Remedies were issued "to secure the social interest in peace and order, not to
vindicate an individual private right." Pound, Interests of Personalty, 28 HARV. L.
REV. 343, 356 (1915).
The remedy Was termed the composition and it was paid to the kindred. In the
case of a killing, a wer was payable to the kindred to satisfy vengeance for an insult
to the kindred. Out of the social interest in peace and order grew the idea of "an
individual interest secured by an individual right." Id. See also W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 51 (1903). Holdsworth stated, "[t]he main principle of the
earlier law is that an act causing physical damage must, in the interests of peace, be
paid for." Id.
85. See DAMAGES, supra note 84, at § 1.02.
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covery possible; an opportunity mistakenly believed to be a basic
right." Therefore, it is possible that an award will either overcompensate or undercompensate the plaintiff for 'his actual injury.
If the plaintiff were awarded a windfall (overcompensated), the
defendant would have exceeded his duty to justly compensate the
plaintiff; if the plaintiff were awarded a deprivation (undercompensated), the defendant would not have fully discharged his duty to
justly compensate the plaintiff. In essence, were a deprivation
awarded, a portion of the plaintiffs basic right to compensation
would be unexercised and a portion of the-defendant's correspond87
ing duty to compensate would be undischarged.
An award may be issued, simultaneously satisfying the plaintiff's basic right and discharging the defendant's duty to compensate, justice thus being done, in any judicial forum despite the fact
that awards may differ between forums. This is a necessary tenet of
a multidistrict judicial system." Justice in such a legal system cannot demand an exact award of a precise judgment equal in amount
to the plaintiff's injury. Rather, a judgment of an award within a
particular range of possible "just amounts," which could be called
an award of an abstract amount, constitutes just compensation for a
plaintiff's injuries. 9
This range of possible "just amounts" of judgments explains the
86. See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text. The belief that such an opportunity is a basic right is mistaken because a plaintiff's basic right is to receive just
compensation, regardless of what forum or tribunal issues the award.
87. No similar offsetting right and duty pertain to a windfall because a plaintiff
does not have a basic right to an award of a windfall.
88. Allocating cases to different forums based on reasons such as personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and venue would not make sense if justice were
only available in some, but not all forums. If some forums were bankrupt in terms of
justice, a basis for constitutional due process claims would exist.

89.

See E. KAMENKA & A. TAY, JUSTICE 1-5 (1980). Kamenka and Tay describe

justice as a concept sliding between two poles: positive law and morality. The positive
law pole equates justice with conformity to law. "This concept of justice rules out, as
a contradiction in terms, the concept of an unjust legal system or procedure.
...
Id.
at 3. This concept tends to place special emphasis on procedure and treating parties
equally according to the law. Id. This view of justice is sometimes referred to as comparative justice.
"Comparative principles all share the form of the Aristotelian paradigm that justice requires that relatively similar cases be treated similarly and relatively dissimilar
cases be treated dissimilarly in direct proportion to the relevant difference between
them." Id.
The other pole is much broader. At it lie the concepts of distributive justice and
universal justice, with their conflicts over merit and the fundamental basis of entitlement. Id. According to John Stuart Mill, justice is a name for a certain class of moral
rules which embodies the essentials of human well-being and, therefore, demands a
greater absolute obligation than any other rule for the guidance of life. Mill, Utilitari-

anism, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 321, 342-44 (M. Cohen Ed. 1961);
see also H. SIDWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 252 (7th ed. 1907); cf D. LYONS, FORMS
AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM

principle); S.

SMART

& B.

(1965) (emphasizing shortcomings of the Utilitarianism

WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM:, FOR AND AGAINST (1979).
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difference in awards from one forum to another. Accordingly, there
is no relevant difference between satisfying the plaintiffs interest
(receiving the highest award possible) and satisfying the plaintiff's
basic right (just compensation).9 Thus, allowing a plaintiff to litigate individually and to forum shop are not defensible on the
ground that justice so demands, because, although damage awards
may differ as between forums, justice nevertheless is done in all
forums.
A plaintiff is not given mode and forum choices because he has
a basic right to them, but because the legal institution has declared
in a grant of ordinary rights that he may so choose. This declaration
neither bestows nor creates any basic rights. Rather, this declaration
simply grants ordinary rights which the legal institution may
extinguish.9
Granting the plaintiff these choices in any given setting is justifiable only if it results in a balance among the three interests present in all litigation.9 2 Thus, concerns for the plaintiff's compensa90. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (discussion of basic rights
and their corresponding duties). See also R. BAUER, ESSENTIALS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 147 (1919). Bauer stated that "[tihe amount of damages assessed in favor of the
plaintiff .. .is usually intended to commensurate with the amount of damage actually
and certainly suffered by the plaintiff as a result of [the] defendant's wrong ..
" R.
BAUER, ESSENTIALS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 147 (1919). The requirement that actual
damage be suffered is consistent with the term abstract amount. It is not until the
abstract amount is certainty shown, however, that any amount is awarded. The degree of difficulty in proving damages with certainty further explains why awards may
differ between forums. This difficulty also explains why at times the abstract amount
is not awarded and the plaintiff, despite a seemingly "valid" claim, goes remediless.
If a plaintiff had a right to a windfall, the defendant would in effect be subject to
punitive damages. An indiscriminate policy of awarding punitive damages would contravene their purpose. "Exemplary or punitive damages are assessed in order to punish the defendant for malicious, wanton and reckless conduct and to deter future
wrongdoing by setting an example for the benefit of the public. Punitive damages are
not intended to compensate the injured party for loss.
DAMAGES, supra note 84
at § 1.03.3.
A distinction has been made between the right to seek punitive damages and the
right to collect punitive damages. See Comment, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1157 (1983). The stated distinction is that while a plaintiff "may not have a right to collect punitive damages, he
may initially have a right to seek them." Id. But cf. Skywalk Cases, supra note 2, at
1176. ("a claimant's interest in exacting punishment against a deserving defendant is
recognized by the law and must be protected").
91. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text. In the words of Justice
Holmes, "a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits
certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;
and so of a legal right." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 458-59
(1897). Justice Holmes's "judgment of the court" refers to justice. See id. Because
institutions do bestow claims and privileges, it follows ipso facto that they may extinguish those same claims. Thus, the legal institution drafts and adopts statutes and
laws, and later may abolish those very laws. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments To the
Rules of Civil Procedure For the United States Dist. Cts., 39 F.R.D. 73, 74-167
(1966) (adopting new procedural rules and abolishing old procedural rules).
92. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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tion, the defendant's liability and judicial economy, play key roles in
the determination whether mass torts demand a fresh policy declaration limiting a plaintiffs choice to litigate individually and to forum shop.93 These interests properly can be viewed as a three-variable equation, the solution of which governs society's policy
determinations concerning ordinary rights.94
The first variable-the plaintiffs just compensation-may be
satisfied in every forum." The second variable-the just amount
due from the defendant-directly corresponds to the first variable
and, therefore, may be satisfied in every forum as well.96 Therefore,
although the plaintiffs interest and the defendant's interest appear
somewhat antagonistic, they really are not. Rather, their interests
are compatible because their rights and duties are simply inverse of
one another.9 7 Consequently, in the three-variable equation that
should determine the proper policies in all litigation situations, a
perfect balance is struck between two of the three variables. Accordingly, in mass tort settings, the third variable is the sole criterion
governing whether individual or class litigation is proper. The third
variable is the final interest: conserving judicial resources.9"
Aggregating many individual suits in a mass tort class action
clearly would conserve tremendous judicial resources. As noted in
Dalkon Shield, litigating mass tort claims individually would bankrupt most courts' calendars and clog judicial circuits into the next
century. Undoubtedly, one large suit initially would burden a
court.9 9 But, in comparison to the aggregate time and expense ex93. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-are an example of how balancing the
three interests manifests itself in institutional mandates. Different situations which
strike different balances among the three interests explain how there can be several
different rules pertaining to joinder of claims and joinder of parties. See supra note 4
(listing joinder provisions).
94. The appropriateness of a mass tort class action can be shown in a mathematical equation. The three concerns of all litigation, the plaintiff's compensation,
the defendant's liability and judicial economy would be represented by the primary
variables X, Y and Z. The nature of the litigation situation would be secondary variables a, b and c. Thus, a basic equation may be formulated, the solution of which
should dictate how the legal institution is to govern. The sum X + Y + Z renders
different results in differing situations and, therefore, requires that different standards apply. The secondary variables pertain to the different situations for which the
equation must be calculated to its conclusion. In a mass tort situation, different secondary variables are present which affect the sum of the primary variables. The difference in the sum in a mass tort situation as compared to an ordinary tort situation
mandates that mass torts be litigated in class actions, not individual suits.
95. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussion of the first
variable).
96. See id.
97. See supra notes 64-67, 87-90 and accompanying text (discussion of rights
and duties).
98. See supra note 61 (identifying the three interests at stake in every action).
99. See Dalkon Shield, supra note 2, at 851. For a discussion of Dalkon Shield,
see supra note 57.
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pended litigating many small suits, mass tort class actions indisputably would better promote judicial economy. 00 As a result, the resources of presently over-crowded circuits could be reallocated.' At
a time when the Chief Justice of the highest court of the land has
suggested a special addition to the Supreme Court to combat the
strain on judicial resources, the benefits mass tort class actions offer
judicial economy hardly can be reasonably debated.
The onslaught of mass torts, such as the Bhopal and Agent Orange catastrophes, has created unique litigation problems which demand a solution. Examining the effect on the three interests present
in every lawsuit indicates that in a mass tort setting a different interplay is struck than is struck in either individual litigation or in
ordinary class action litigation. This difference calls for a re-evaluating of Rule 23's proficiency.1 0 2 Such a re-evaluation has been
shunned heretofore, however, because of the widespread belief that
a plaintiff has a basic right to litigate individually and to choose his
forum. 103

Becoming aware of the distinction between basic rights and ordinary rights is the most important step in considering whether
mass tort lawsuits are so extraordinary in comparison to other lawsuits as to warrant establishing a mandatory mass tort class action.
If an awareness of the distinction between basic rights and ordinary
rights permeated the legal community, a plaintiff's right to litigate
individually and to choose a forum would be recognized as distinctly
lower in order than his basic right to compensation. Only when this
distinction is recognized will it be possible to apply the three-variable equation and determine that the basic right to compensation
could be adequately protected through a mass tort class action.
100. See Comment, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule
23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1147 (1983) ("[a]ny effort to define and coordinate
the interests of a large class of plaintiffs requires significant time and energy. Yet this
additional cost is more than offset by the associated elimination of waste").
101. "[Allthough the burden on judicial resources and unrelated litigants might
be greatly increased in the court in which all claims are centralized, the aggregate cost
to the judicial system would be reduced." Id.
102. In discussing the nature of how the law works, Justice Benjamin Cardozo
stated:
"[tihe common law does not work from pre-established truths of universal and
inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them deductively. Its method is
inductive, and it draws its generalizations from particulars. . . .Every new case
is an experiment and if the accepted rule which seems applicable yields a
result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered."
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 22-23 (1921) (emphasis added).
In a similar vein, Monroe Smith said, "[t]he principles themselves are continually retested; for if the rules derived from a principle do not work well, the principle
itself must ultimately be re-examined." M. SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909).
103. See supra notes 62-82 and accompanying text (discussion of the right to
litigate individually).
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CONCLUSION

Tremendous resources are wasted because mass torts are not litigated in class actions. Recognizing offensive collateral estoppel's inherent dispositive effects coupled with a liberal interpretation of
Rule 23's requirements would mandate mass tort class certification
and eliminate this waste. Furthermore, abandoning the current misconception that a plaintiff has a basic right to litigate individually
and to choose his forum would permit consideration of amending
Rule 23 to expressly sanction mass tort class actions. Either alternative would conserve the valuable judicial resources which presently
are being wasted.
The manner by which mass tort class certification is achieved,
whether through a liberal interpretation of Rule 23 or its amendment, is not of particular importance. Of paramount importance is
that the mode of litigating mass torts properly balances the three
interests which are at stake in every lawsuit and thereby fulfills the
goals of the Federal Rules. When the interests of justly compensating plaintiffs, defendants paying only their just dues, and conserving
judicial resources are weighed, it is evident that in a mass tort context, the plaintiff's and the defendant's interests offset each other
regardless of whether claims are individually or jointly litigated.
However, litigating mass tort claims in a class action clearly conserves valuable judicial resources in comparison to litigating mass
tort claims individually. This relevantly different effect on judicial
resources, coupled with the concurrent satisfaction of the plaintiff's
basic right and discharge of the defendant's duty in either mode,
indicate that the time has come to litigate mass torts in mandatory
class actions-to litigate catastrophes without creating litigation
catastrophes.
Matthew K. Phillips

